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Banking Reform in Russia: A Window of Opportunity? 
 
                        Abstract 
 
Only a successful implementation of an overall reform program will enable Russian 
banks to provide financial intermediation and assist in the country's development from a 
nascent market economy to a mature financial system. The chances for reform are better 
now than at any time during the last decade. Favorable political and economic 
conditions and a change in attitude among bank management have created an unusual 
window of opportunity. The paper analyzes the past performance of the Russian 
banking industry, evaluates the reform agenda of the monetary authority, and argues for 
an overall reform program in order to seize the available opportunity. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The situation in the Russian banks has improved markedly since the dark days following 
the 1998 financial crisis. The banks have grown in terms of assets, equity, deposits, loans 
and profit. Many of these key indicators, measured as a percentage of GDP, now exceed 
their pre-crisis levels (Table I). These positive developments have taken place in step with 
Russia’s general economic recovery. 
Nevertheless, the sector reflects major structural weaknesses in the Russian economy. 
Russia does not have a functioning banking industry. The sector fails to provide a channel 
for collecting financial resources and directing them into value-added projects (Troika 
Dialog, 2002). Instead of contributing to capital accumulation, majority of the private 
banks remains effectively treasury functions for their owners’ other (usually industrial) 
interests (Fitch Ratings, 2002).  
There is little disagreement among analysts and policy makers that the banking sector in 
Russia is in dire need of reform. Why? At least four reasons can be cited. First, the ability 
to sustain the positive economic gains made in the last few years depend, to a large extent, 
on a well functioning banking sector. The current system cannot adequately support 
economic growth as very little of its activity consists of financial intermediation 
[Komulainen et al, 2003; Rautava, 1996; Ruehl, 2001; Tompson, 1997]. The role of the 
banking sector in facilitating economic growth depends, to a large extent, on its ability to 
mobilize savings and match its’ supply with the demand for investment.
1 However, more 
than 95 percent of all corporate investment in Russia in 2002 were financed through equity 
and retained earnings rather than bank loans. 
Second, reform will prevent a repeat of the 1998 banking crisis and avoid contagion by 
keeping the problems of Russian banks from igniting global financial turmoil similar to the 
experiences in Thailand and Indonesia in 1997. Third, Russia’s desire to join the World 2 
Trade Organization (WTO) points out to the urgency of reform as the banking and 
financial sector has to conform to WTO obligations. 
Finally, there has been a significant increase in Russia’s foreign investment inflow (US 
$20 billion in 2002 compared to US $9.5 billion in 1999). However, the changed 
composition of the inflow – sharp decrease in foreign direct investment and increase in 
commercial and trade credits and bond investment – indicate that it is actually Russian 
money coming home through repatriation (Ruehl, 2003). Being incapable of facilitating an 
efficient allocation of these capital inflows, the banking sector will try to cope with this 
liquidity influx by building up assets through increased lending and investment activities. 
This carries the danger of creating a bad loan portfolio and of bidding up assets prices, i.e., 
creating an asset price bubble (Ruehl, 2003). The biggest protection against such a scenario 
would be a strong, competent and efficient banking sector.  
Despite widespread agreement on the need, there is much disagreement on the nature and 
speed of reform. Opinions range from imposing stiff capital requirements on domestic 
banks to removal of all restrictions on the activities of foreign banks.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolving nature of banking in Russia since the 
break up of the former Soviet Union and suggest reforms that would help the banks in 
playing an adequate role in the nation’s quest for sustained economic growth.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next three sections look at the early development in the 
banking system, the 1998 banking crisis and the response to the crisis. This is followed by 
a discussion of the current status of banking in Russia and associated problems. Finally, the 
study focuses on what should be the priority for banking sector reform and compares them 
with the steps taken by the monetary authorities. The paper ends with concluding remarks. 
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2 EARLY  DEVELOPMENT 
Commercial banking took shape in Russia in the late 1980s when the first non-state banks 
were formed under the 1988 law on cooperatives. As part of the economic reforms, the 
country moved away from the strictly centralized control of the mono-bank system to a 
relatively more diversified and functionally more specialized two-tier system. The central 
banking functions were vested with Gosbank [since 1991: the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR)], while commercial banking functions were performed by five specialized 
institutions: Sberbank – savings; Vneshtorgbank – foreign trade; Promstroibank – 
industrial lending; Agroprombank – agricultural lending; and Zhilsotsbank – housing.  
During the early years of transition, companies and other organizations were given the 
right to create their own financial institutions. These groups, known as the financial 
industrial group (FIGs), played an important role in shaping the banking system. In many 
cases, the ownership of the FIG banks were the same as the ownership of the key 
companies of the group. They functioned as an alliance, with banks helping restructure the 
companies and ease the cash flows between firms linked in a production chain. Individual 
entrepreneurs who participated in the voucher privatization program and ‘loans-for-share’ 
scheme generally formed FIGs. In most cases, the working capital requirements of the 
companies were met through bank financing and banks acted as merely their FIGs’ 
financial vehicle, with the true value concentrated in the companies. (Fitch Ratings, 2002).
2 
During the early and mid-1990s, the sector evolved in an unregulated manner in which 
banks were involved primarily in speculating in the financial markets.
3 The presence of a 
large and high-yielding government debt encouraged banks to buy and sell Russian 
treasury bonds (GKO/OFZ) [especially in 1997-98]. They were also involved in providing 
subsidized credits to enterprises, financing trade operations, foreign exchange speculations, 
and engaging in non-monetary exchange of commodities. Instead of performing their 4 
institutional role of financial intermediation, banks were involved in serious corporate 
governance abuse due to the presence of unreliable accounting standards, weak central 
bank supervision, cross-shareholding, poor transparency and corruption (Ippolito, 2002). 
Lax regulation and licensing policies meant that banks grew in numbers from less than 100 
in 1988 to almost 2600 in 1995, nearly 2300 of which were operating (RECEP, 1997; Fitch 
Ratings, 2002). 
Beginning in 1994, the Russian banks faced three major crises. The first was in November 
1994, when ruble collapsed; the second was the liquidity crisis in the interbank market in 
August 1995 when a number of large banks failed; and, the third was the government’s 
default on its ruble bonds and subsequent ruble devaluation in August 1998. 
 
3 BANKING  CRISIS  OF  1998 
The banking crisis of 1998 exposed the underlying structural flaws of the banking sector. 
While triggered by the ruble devaluation and the freezing of the short-term treasury bills 
(GKOs) operations, the banks were vulnerable to the crisis due to the high concentration of 
assets among highly leveraged and badly managed banks, increased foreign borrowing, 
exposure to exchange rate risk, credit risk, risk of default by the government and the 
consequent loss of client confidence. Despite the expectation by some analysts of a ruble 
devaluation since late 1997, the banks didn’t change their risk profiles, as providing 
hedging with financial derivatives to foreign banks was very profitable. Banks borrowed at 
relatively low foreign interest rates, lend at high domestic interest rates and entered into 
unhedged off-balance sheet currency forward contracts.
4 Having been exposed to both 
price and credit risk, banks were unable to repay their obligations on forward contracts 5 
when the devaluation actually took place in August [see Ippolito, 2002 and Perotti, 2002 
for a detail description of the role of banks and financial groups during the crisis]. 
There are at least two differing views on the causes of the banking crisis in 1998. 
According to one, the crisis was caused by bank illiquidity rather than bank insolvency 
(Alexander et al, 2000). Based on this interpretation, the initial response of the government 
was to supply additional liquidity into the system. Multilateral donors including the World 
Bank and IMF, on the other hand, acknowledged the severe liquidity problems faced by the 
banks, but considered insolvency due to the growth of non-performing loan portfolio to be 
the primary cause of the crisis. 
The crisis created a havoc leaving over half of all banks, including the major ones, 
insolvent. The number of banks dropped to about 1600. The crisis also saw, at least 
initially, a diminished economic and political role of the private sector banks, especially 
those owned by FIGs. However, these banks’ former owners stripped their assets and 
recycled them into so-called ‘bridge banks’ which received all of their groups’ businesses.
5 
The interbank credit market also collapsed due to lack of liquidity and confidence. 
Failure of the banking sector to perform financial intermediation during the 1991-98 period 
can be attributed to, among others, two main factors – high and volatile inflation, and 
persistence of large fiscal deficits and correspondingly large government borrowing 
requirements (Tompson, 2000). Coupled with political uncertainty, the crowding out effect 
of these two factors limited private sector firm’s access to credit. 
4  MEASURES FOLLOWING THE CRISIS 
Immediately after the crisis, the Central Bank of Russia adopted two important measures: 
(i) a 90-day moratorium on the repayment of banks’ foreign debts and foreign exchange 
term contracts; and (ii) transfer of all personal deposits from about three dozen troubled 6 
private banks to the Sberbank.
6 These measures helped to achieve two goals: provide the 
banks with some breathing space within which to negotiate with their creditors on the 
restructuring of their due payments; and, help to protect personal deposits as the Sberbank 
was the only bank where household deposits were insured.
7  
Despite the urgent need for a thorough restructuring of the banking sector, nothing 
substantial happened during the early months after the crisis. This was mainly due to 
conflict of political interests among the various players involved: bank owners, the Central 
Bank, the Duma and the government. Eventually, the ’Law on the Restructuring of Credit 
Organizations’ was approved in July 1999 leading to the formation of ARCO – an Agency 
for Reconstruction of Credit Organizations. The government also enacted the financial 
sector bankruptcies and bank restructuring legislation in February and July 1999, 
respectively. 
However, a number of inherent problems made these legislative efforts relatively 
ineffective. First, in order to qualify for restructuring under the 1999 Law, a bank had to 
satisfy certain size criteria that favored the large banks. Second, ARCO proved to be weak 
as it had little starting capital, made no attempt to counter asset-stripping by problem banks 
in the process of their debt restructuring, and lacked power to close down inefficient banks 
or interfere with their operations against the will of the bank management. Third, the 
necessary institutional framework and political resolve to implement this legislation 
remained weak. 
The early efforts for bank restructuring, therefore, failed to safeguard the rights of minority 
shareholders and creditors. Weak bankruptcy legislation, ineffective monitoring by the 
central bank, and failed attempts to liquidate insolvent banks were clear examples of lax in 
corporate governance that removed any residual confidence of the public in the banking 
sector.
8  7 
 
5 CURRENT  STATUS
9 
As of the end of December 2002, 1329 credit institutions are licensed to conduct business 
transactions in Russia (Table II). Total assets of the sector are about U.S. $118 billion (35 
percent of GDP) (CBR, 2002; see also Table I]. Corresponding figures are over 100 
percent of GDP for the Czech Republic, over 70 percent for Estonia and about 60 percent 
for Poland [Komulainen et al, 2003). Money on deposits with banks represent only 19 
percent of GDP compared to about 50 percent in the Czech Republic and Germany. 
Lending represents only 40 percent of bank assets. As a percentage of GDP, bank loans 
account for only 18.4 percent (Table I and Figures 7 and 8), far below the 25 percent 
average for Eastern Europe and 38 percent for Latin America (Troika Dialog, 2002). The 
little banking that is done in Russia is carried out by the 23 state-owned banks, such as, 
Sberbank and Vnesheconombank (VEB), and a small number of private banks, such as 
Alfa Bank and MDM Bank (see Tables VIII and IX). Most of the small banks do not deal 
with the general public and act simply as treasury operations for the companies that own 
them. 
                  Figures 7 and 8 here 
 
The stock of all ruble deposits entrusted to banks by households and companies increased 
manifold since the 1998 crisis (Tables IV and V and Figures 2 and 3 ).
10 This increase in  
                Figures 2 and 3 here 
household deposits has been driven by time deposits, while demand deposits registered a 
decline (Table V). The maturity of household deposits has lengthened over the last four 
years. One-year to three-year ruble and foreign currency deposits grew particularly fast 
(Table IV). Claims on household and non-financial private enterprises account for almost 8 
half of the bank’s total lending (Table VI and Figures 4 and 5). The stock of bank claims 
on publicly owned enterprises is only 6 percent compared to bank credit to the private 
sector.  
         Figures 4 and 5 here 
The main characteristics of the banking sector can be summarized as follows: 
•  Small size – In terms of a number of parameters, the banking sector in Russia is 
very small (Figues 1). The sector’s total assets are 15 percent of GDP, against a 
25 percent average in central Europe (Euromoney, 2003a). Moreover, banks 
finance about 5 percent of investment in the country, compared to 15 to 30 
percent in many countries. Similarly, the 8 percent household deposits/GDP ratio 
is well below comparable international figures. Again, loans to the private sector 
and to nonfinancial public enterprises amount to less than 20 percent of GDP, 
compared to 80-120 percent in many West European countries. 
                             Figures 1 here  
•  Domination of state banks – Despite the proliferation of banks, state-owned 
banks, specifically, Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank (VTB), dominate the banking 
sector in terms of both volume of activity and number of branches across the 
country. The state holds majority stake in over 20 banks that account for 37 
percent of the sector’s total asset (Troika Dialog, 2002). In addition, the state also 
holds minority shares in several hundred banks (Korhonen, 2001). Although one-
third of registered banks are state-owned, they account for two-thirds of the 
banking sector’s charter capital. Of the 3326 branches of operating credit 
institutions in Russia, 1162 are branches of Sberbank and its regional subsidiaries 
(Table II). This implies a branch to bank ratio of fewer than two for the rest of 
the system that does not indicate development of significant alternative network. 9 
In a third of Russia’s 89 regions there is no bank except Sberbank. It benefits 
from state guarantee of household deposits, a strong internal payments system 
and a key role in the distribution of state pensions (World Bank, 2002). As of the 
end of March, 2003, it holds a little over 66 percent of all household deposits in 
the banking system, and is responsible for around 30 percent of aggregate 
corporate lending (BOFIT, 2003a). The 29 next largest banks combined hold 
about 15 percent of household deposits and 40 percent of corporate loan stock 
(BOFIT, 2002).  
•  House banks – A large number of private banks do not operate as normal credit 
institutions, but rather act as treasuries for financial-industrial groups and large 
corporations (Ippolito, 2002). Instead of providing intermediation and other 
legitimate banking services to the general public, they are involved in the 
issuance and discounting of veksels for such activities as avoiding reserve 
requirements, tax evasion, money laundering, and facilitating capital flight 
(World Bank, 2002).
11 In recent years, a number of private banks have gained 
prominence due to their association with large financial-industrial groups. This is 
the case for Rosbank (linked to Interros), Doveritelni I Investizionni Bank 
(Rosprom) and Sobinbank (Lukoil). On the other hand, a number of banks lead 
the financial-industrial group, such as, Alfa Bank with Alfa Group and MDM 
Bank with MDM Group. 
•  Phantom institutions – Another striking feature of the banking industry is the 
existence of ghost or phantom institutions. For example, the number of registered 
banks actually operating in the market between 1997 and 2001 never exceeded 
75 percent of the licensed banks. 10 
•  Short-term nature of bank operations – Bank’s balance sheets are heavily 
weighted with short-term liabilities, as the number of potential investors with 
long-term interests in ruble assets is limited (Salonen, 2002). All household 
deposits are legally required to be available on demand, regardless of contractual 
maturity. Household deposits termed more than one year dominate in Sberbank 
while other banks get enterprise deposits with a maturity of 5 weeks or less. This 
inability to attract long-term liability limits credit expansion.
12 
•  Shortage of banking products – Russia remains primarily a cash society although 
credit card business has recorded an upward trend in recent years. Consumer 
financing is also at a very initial stage and only a few banks in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg have invested in this area. Banks’ lack of interest in consumer credit 
can be explained by shortage of medium- and long-term funding, absence of 
credit history and poor demand from customers (Fitch Ratings, 2002). 
•  Concentration – The sector is highly concentrated with just 30 banks accounting 
for more than two-thirds of system assets and half of system capital. Moreover, 
an overwhelming majority of banks are very small. According to the latest 
figures available, less than 250 banks have capital exceeding the European Union 
minimum capital requirement of 5 million Euros (World Bank, 2002a). Further, 
geographic concentration is also a strong feature. Almost half of all banking 
institution is based in the Moscow region and they represent about four-fifths of 
the system assets. 
 Russia’s banking system lags behind that of other transition economies in a number of 
areas (see, for example, Table X). First, compared to these countries, the large state-owned 
banks in Russia have not been privatized. Consequently, these banks dominate the retail 
and corporate banking markets. Second, the Russian banking sector has received limited 11 
foreign investment compared to other East European and Baltic States. In these countries, 
foreigners now control over half of the banking market; while Russian banks remain in the 
hands of the government and private domestic companies, themselves usually controlled 
by a handful of oligarchs. Third, the Russian system is highly fragmented and has 
remained largely unchanged in the last few years. In other transition economies, 
bankruptcy laws and regulatory reforms have been enacted in order to restructure failing or 
unprofitable banks, eliminate restrictions on foreign investment and initiate privatization. 
 
6  WHAT IS WRONG WITH RUSSIAN BANKS?    
The banking system is far from playing its traditional role of financial intermediary. Apart 
from the negligible share of fixed investment financed by bank borrowing, monetization 
and bank lending are small relative to GDP (Table X). Corresponding figures for other 
Central and East European economies are much higher. The role of the financial market as 
measured by bond issuance and equity market capitalization is also negligible relative to 
the other countries in the Table.  
The sector suffers from a number of inherent problems. Distrust of banks along with tax 
avoidance and payment traditions remain leading reasons for the low level of deposits 
(19% of GDP in 2002, see Table I), although the large shadow economy also avoids banks 
(Korhonen, 2001; Salonen, 2002).
13 Most Russians prefer to keep savings (often in US 
dollars) hidden under their mattresses rather than in ruble in banks. Estimates of cash 
stashed in home range from a low of $20 billion to a high of $70 billion.
14 Lack of safe and 
attractive investment opportunities at home have led to money being moved abroad. Such 
capital flight and cash hoarding retards growth by reducing the amount of funds available 
for financing domestic investment (Figure 6). 12 
  Figures 6 here  
The banks are undercapitalized, opaque in their ownership and operations, and poorly 
audited. Most of them are exposed to one or two major borrowers, sectors or commodities. 
Many small banks still follow the Russian Accounting System (RAS) rather than the 
International Accounting System (IAS). This limits the CBR’s ability to evaluate the 
soundness of banking activity. Accounts prepared to RAS standards are intended to satisfy 
the requirements of Russian tax inspectors and bank regulators; while those prepared to 
IAS standards are aimed more at external investors, such as, shareholders, creditors and 
potential business partners. As a result, preparing accounts to IAS standards requires a far 
greater degree of discretion, risk analysis and meticulous reporting of a bank’s economic 
activity. A related problem is the absence of reliable data on bank activity. Although a 
large amount of data is available, the use of RAS by many reporting banks allow them to 
inflate capital levels, deflate non-performing loans and prevent securities from being 
marked to market, thus making the data set suspect and of limited worth.
15  
 
7 UNFINISHED  AGENDA 
In the absence of a clear strategy, the process of bank restructuring in recent years has been 
slow, uncoordinated and inefficient. As piecemeal reform can only prolong the agony, the 
issue of overall reform needs to be confronted now. At a minimum, the following concerns 
need to be addressed. First, the monopoly position of Sberbank should be reviewed as its 
sheer size restrains competition. Decisions must be taken concerning the business strategy, 
appropriate organization, and functioning of the bank (Komulainen, 1999). However, due 
to the bank’s relative size, social importance and regional service, any radical change in its 
operations ownership structure – which is majority-owned by the CBR - could have 13 
negative and far-reaching effects (BOFIT, 2003; World Bank, 2002a). Therefore, 
authorities need to proceed with caution. Simultaneous efforts should also be made to 
provide incentives to competitors of Sberbank to grow and increase the volume and 
spectrum of services to clients.  
Second, state-owned banks dominate the sector in terms of volume of activity and number 
of branches nationwide. The involvement of state-owned banks should be reduced, along 
with the withdrawal of the CBR from direct participation in the commercial banking 
business. Third, as 1,335 (as of March 2003) credit insitutions are currently licensed to 
conduct business transactions, greater trust in the system would be promoted by 
consolidation, i.e., fewer banks that have greater viability and are run more prudently. 
Fourth, unlike most other central and eastern European countries, Russian banking sector 
remains unattractive for long-term investment by global financial institutions (Komulainen, 
1999).
16 Foreign banks have, thus far, preferred to set up fully owned subsidiaries (Fitch 
Ratings, 2002).
17 One reason for the low interest shown by foreign banks is their caution in 
risk assessment due to the small size of the market and minimum retail banking 
opportunity.
18 As opening one or two branches in the major cities can do trade financing, 
foreign banks can avoid the large fixed capital necessary to open new branches. Attempts 
to attract foreign banking operation in Russia can only be successful with the 
implementation of a whole range of reforms including a lowering of capital requirements 
for foreign banks and allowing profit repatriation.  
Finally, transparency and accountability should be established for improving public 
confidence in the banking industry. This calls for stronger supervisory and regulatory 
framework for banks, strengthened bankruptcy procedures, better creditor and depositor 
protection measures and reform of the judiciary system so that regulatory decisions can be 
implemented fully and enforced quickly. 14 
The change in the CBR’s top management in April 2002 offered hope of a clear political 
desire to implement long overdue structural changes in the sector. On July 11, 2002 
President Putin signed a federal law affirming the independent status of the CBR. The new 
management team, with broad political support, has developed a reform agenda and a 
number of specific steps have already been taken. 
First, all banks are scheduled to switch to the International Accounting Standard (IAS) by 
2007.
19 It will force them to become more transparent and will weed out hundreds of small 
and unreliable banks that either do not meet the capital adequacy ratios or are not safe for 
customer deposits (World Bank, 2002). This will also encourage the consolidation of the 
sector around a few larger and more reliable banks. Related tax reform, besides reducing 
the profit tax on banks from 43 percent to 24 percent, will help to guide the tax accounting 
of banks towards the new standard (Korhonen, 2001). Second, a ’deposit insurance law’ is 
awaiting final approval by the Duma in 2003. According to this legislation, from January 
1, 2005 banks that qualify to participate in a deposit insurance scheme would pay 0.15 
percent of their average quarterly deposits into a fund managed by ARCO.
20 After the law 
comes into effect, deposits up to 20,000 rubles in member banks would be fully insured, 
while deposits between 20,000 and 120,000 rubles would be covered up to 75 percent. The 
CBR will issue special banking licenses to commercial banks meeting tough financial 
criteria that will allow them to take retail deposits. This will help to reduce Sberbank’s 
control of the retail business, lower the number of total banks, and level the playing field 
by enabling the private banks to expand and thereby inject competition into the sector.
21 
Third, the CBR has transferred its full ownership in the country’s second largest bank, 
Vneshtorgbank (VTB), to the government. It has also lowered its stake in three major 
banks abroad by selling their shares to the VTB. In late 2002, the government reached a 
tentative agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 15 
over the sale of up to a 20 percent stake in VTB, and the state similarly plans to sell off its 
minority stakes in more than 500 small and medium-sized banks. The proposed sale of a 
large stake in VTB could provide a higher benchmark for the valuation of Russia’s banking 
business than that afforded by Sberbank, the only bank stock currently traded. Meanwhile, 
the 12 percent ceiling on aggregate foreign ownership in the banking sector (which was 
meaningless due to low attraction of the banking market) has been lifted and trading in 
banking stock for non-residents has been liberalized thereby increasing liquidity (BOFIT, 
2003). These steps may prompt a number of banks to start offering IPOs in the future. 
Fourth, beginning in 2007, the minimum capital adequacy requirements for all banks have 
been set at 5 million Euros. As of 2005, the licenses of banks with less than 5 million Euro 
capital will be automatically revoked if their capital adequacy ratio falls below 10 percent. 
Currently, the threshold is 2 percent.
22 
Finally, legislative changes are also in progress with respect to protection in banking 
business, For example, a law on enforcing collateralized mortgages has been adopted, and 
improved legislation on bank bankruptcies is moving in the Duma. Similarly, laws on 
disclosure requirements for actual owners of banks and the quality of bank management 
are already in the enactment process (BOFIT, 2003b). New regulations requiring banks to 
tidy up their capital statements to rid them of artifically inflated capital based on assets or 
guarantees granted to third parties have been introduced. CBR expects to inspect the 
capital of all banks within the next two years.The new monitoring and reporting procedures 
and tighter requirements for capital adequacy have started to produce some results. Recent 
decisions by Gazprom, Lukoil, InterRos and several other corporations to sell off large 
stakes in their banks indicate a growing trend in turning banks from internal treasuries into 
profit generating centers (Troika Dialog, 2002). 
 16 
8 CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Russia stands at a turning point in its transition history. For the first time since the collapse 
of the former Soviet Union, the country’s economy has been growing rapidly, boosted by 
growing domestic demand, higher energy prices, and a clear commitment to reform and 
fiscal discipline by the government. However, such growth, fuelled by the oil and energy 
sector and import substitution, has a narrow base as it is vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
international commodity price as well as exchange rates. Broadening this base depends 
upon the availability of financing to a much wider group of entities such as the small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
Experiences from a number of other transition economies have shown that the SMEs are 
crucial in keeping the economy growing through job creation and technological and 
entrepreneurial innovation. Their role in the Russian economy, however, has been very 
small.
23 Unlike large corporations who are able to use retained earnings to finance 
expansion, the SMEs depend on the banks to provide the financial resources for growth. A 
lack of mechanism to match available resources with those willing to invest has hampered 
their growth. If financial intermediation functioned more smoothly, the SMEs could 
correct the existing imbalances and become the engine of strong growth.
24 
This is why banking reform is important in Russia. Given a thin equity market and low 
foreign direct investment, banks must be the bridge that will connect available resources 
with those willing to invest, both geographically and by sector. Some progress on reform 
has already been made. The new management team at the Central Bank of Russia, with 
broad political support, has developed a reform agenda which includes proposals for 
deposit insurance, creditor and depositor protection, improved bank transparency, better 
supervision and enforcement of quality standards in accounting, increased foreign 
participation and lower taxes on bank profits. 17 
The chances for reform are better now than at any time during the last decade. Political and 
economic conditions have created an unusual window of opportunity. There is a clear sign 
of change in attitude among bank owners and management who have started to recognize 
the value of their businesses as a long term source of income that requires commitment of 
significant financial and managerial resources. The political leadership and the monetary 
authorities have also shown an honest willingness to complete banking sector reform. Such 
reform will not be a quick fix. Similar attempts in the past were met with stiff resistance 
from many vested interests. However, with changed political attitude, it may be different 
this time.  18 
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Table I   Russian Banking Statistics (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Year  Bank 
Assets 
Bank 
Loans 
Total 
Deposits 
Household 
Deposits 
1995  22.23  12.74  12.59   
1996  23.19  10.56  11.75   
1997  24.93  10.88  13.21   
1998  34.04  13.83  16.77  7.30 
1999  32.51  11.93  15.34  6.20 
2000  30.94  12.89  15.70  6.10 
2001  32.70  16.24  16.99  7.50 
2002  34.84  18.37  19.07  8.80 
 
Household deposits for 2002 are for January-September period. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
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Table II  Number and Structure of Credit Institutions  
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
 
Credit institutions  1476  1349  1311  1319  1329   1335 
 
Licensed to conduct banking transaction, of which 
 Banks  1447  1315  1274  1276  1282  1285 
  non-bank credit institutions  29  34  37  43  47  50 
 
Credit institutions with  license (permission) 
  to attract personal deposits  1372  1264  1239  1223  1202  1200 
  to conduct transaction in foreign currency  634  669  764  810  839  843 
 
Credit institutions with a  foreign stake in 
authorized capital, licensed to conduct 
banking transactions, of which  142  133  130  126  126  128 
 100%  foreign-owned  organization  18  20  22  23  27  29 
  50-100% foreign ownership  12  12  11  12  10  9 
 
Branches of operating credit institutions  
in Russia of which  4453  3923  3793  3433  3326  3304 
 Sberbank  branches  1852  1689  1529  1233  1162  1157 
  branches of 100% foreign-owned banks  4  4  7  9  12  12 
 
All figures are for December 31 of each year. Figures for 2003 are for March 31. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 23 
Table III  Credit Institutions Grouped by Registered Authorized Capital, Dec. 31 
 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
 
Total number of credit institutions  1476  1349  1311  1319  1329  1335 
 
The percentage share of institutions in each category of authorized capital 
 
Less than 3 million Rubles  23.8  17.0  13.3  9.7  7.7  7.0 
3 m.- 10 m.   31.4  17.0  21.5  16.5  14.5  13.6 
10 m.- 30 m.   23.6  23.2  23.9  24.0  21.9  21.4 
30 m.- 60 m.  12.8  18.8  19.3  19.3  19.0  19.0 
60 m. – 150 m.  4.9  6.9  9.7  13.0  14.9  15.2 
150 m. – 300 m.  1.4  3.2  5.2  7.4  9.3  10.0 
more than 300 m.  2.0  3.9  7.1  10.1  12.7  13.8 
 
The categories are in million Rubles. Figures for 2003 are for March 31. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
 
 24 
 
 
Table IV     Structure of Personal Ruble Deposits in Credit Institutions Classified by Maturity, Dec 31 
 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
 
Total deposits (mil. Rubles)  140982 202783 304659  446408  649123  700656 
 
 
The percentage share of deposits for each maturity period 
Demand deposits  38.13 30.27 33.03  25.82  20.71  19.19 
Up to 30 days  0.31 0.14 0.09  0.06  0.07  0.12 
31–90 days  9.36 9.1  6.89  5.05  3.60  3.68 
91-180 days  44.48 52.04 40.36  30.69  23.85  22.88 
181-365 days  2.75 4.59 7.17  9.15  12.93  13.20 
1-3 years  3.97 3.03 11.86  28.57  37.27  39.27 
3 years and more  1.0  0.82 0.6  0.66  1.57  1.65 
 
* Figures for 2003 are for February 28. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia and author’s calculation. 
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Table V Structure of Corporate Ruble Deposits in Credit Institutions Classified by Maturity, Dec.31 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Total (mil. Rubles)   5535  24821  51317  68121  101319  98493 
 
The percentage share of deposits for each maturity period 
 
demand deposits  5.24  6.79  4.02  3.48  4.01  4.53 
up to 30 days  26.25  26.99  11.01  24.13  18.08  14.00 
31-90 days  19.84  25.96  33.83  19.72  24.89  18.91 
91-180 days  12.63  19.35  17.53  15.82  16.50  16.92 
181-365 days  12.50  8.82  14.02  15.35  17.37  23.03 
1-3 years  15.45  7.52  12.50  11.66  10.40  13.88 
3 years and more  8.09  4.58  7.08  9.85  8.76  8.73 
 
* Figures for 2003 are for February 28.   
    
Source: Central Bank of Russia and author’s calculation. 
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Table VI  Structure of Aggregate Assets of Credit Institutions (in percentages), Dec. 31 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Reserves  6.81 8.95 11.83 10.12  10.77  11.14
Foreign assets  20.27 20.72 18.72 15.94  13.67  13.02
Claims on general government  23.95 24.49 20.66 17.25  15.98  16.16
Claims on non-financial public enterprises  3.09 2.62 2.91 2.34  2.79  2.74
Claims on non-financial private enter. & 
households  31.22 29.19 34.06 41.04  43.12  43.02
Claims on other financial Inst.  0.67 0.73 0.57 0.66  0.75  0.82
Other assets  14.00 13.29 11.25 12.65  12.93  13.10
 
* Figures for 2003 are for February 28. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia and author’s calculation. 
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Table VII   Structure of Aggregate Liabilities of Credit Institutions , (in percentages), Dec. 31 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Demand deposits  14.23  13.97 17.40 17.30  16.25  14.81
Time & savings deposits & foreign 
currency deposits  25.86  25.54 26.73 27.48  30.94  32.35
Restricted deposits  2.02  0.57 0.25 0.62  1.46  1.01
Money market instruments  3.49  6.03 7.50 7.63  9.05  8.59
Foreign liabilities  18.28  12.45 9.78 9.31  9.07  8.37
General government deposits  1.83  1.60 2.14 2.01  1.51  1.79
Liabilities to monetary authorities  6.54  11.2  8.05 7.32  5.11  4.76
Capital accounts  14.93  16.36 17.17 18.09  17.97  19.19
Other liabilities  12.82  12.27 10.97 10.25  9.62  9.62
 
*Figures for 2003 are for February 28.   
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia and author’s calculation. 
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Table VIII  Banking Sector Structure, First Half, 2002 
    
Sberbank Foreign 
banks 
Largest 
local banks
Medium 
banks 
Small 
banks 
Number   1   22   28   50   1212 
Asset range, $ mil.   29000   100-2800   250-3800   100-250   <100 
Capital range, $ mil.   3500 
 
 30-200   80-700   30-80     <30 
 
Share of assets, in %   26   7   42   7   18 
Share of capital, in %   13   5   45   9   28 
Share of retail savings, in %   72   3   13   5   8 
ROE  (in %)   20   14   5   6   4 
ROA (in %)   1.7   1.8   0.9   1.3   1.1 
Leverage (capital/assets), in %   8   13   17   23   26 
 
Note:  Based on Russian accounting standards. The total number of banks during this period 
was 1313. 
 
Source: Troika Dialog (2002). 
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Table IX   Top 20 Retail Banks, First Half, 2002 
 
Bank  Assets  Rank by 
assets 
Equity/ 
 Assets 
 
Retail 
deposits/ 
liabilities 
 
Market 
share 
   $ mill.       %     %   % 
Sberbank   29576   1   11   73  69.10 
Alfa Bank   3848   4   19   20  2.3 
Bank of Moscow   2380   13   7   18  1.4 
Gazprombank   3843   5   18   12  1.4 
Vneshtorgbank (VTB)   4561   2   37   11  1.2 
Rosbank   2325   8   11   13  0.9 
Raiffeisen   1029   26   10   25  0.8 
Int. Moscow Bank   2818   16   5   8  0.8 
Promstroybank   1337   20   9   17  0.7 
Uralsib   1143   10   18   18  0.6 
Menetap   943  23   11   20  0.6 
Avtobank   436  41   13   39  0.5 
MDM   1834   7   15   9  0.5 
V-bank   446  60   11   33  0.5 
Surgutneftagaz   1163   52   4   10  0.4 
Impex Bank   445  45   13   29  0.4 
Nikoil   472  31   18   29  0.4 
Petrocommerce Bank   784  12   24   16  0.3 
Petrovsky   270  123   7   33  0.3 
Zapsibcombank   316  94   10   27  0.3 
 
Source: Troika Dialog (2002) 
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 Table X   Financial Market Depth (percentage of GDP), end of 2001 
 
Country  M2 
Claims on 
private sector
Domestic 
credit 
Total bond 
outstanding 
Equity 
market 
capitalization
Russia  24  17  24  3  27 
Czech Rep.  71  45  50  15  16 
Germany  71  130  148  56  57 
Hungary  43  35  50  26  20 
Japan  123  96  145  107  92 
Poland  43  26  38  20  15 
Slovak Rep.  66  25  62  13  3 
UK  113  69  141  43  153 
USA  64  76  89  115  137 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators, IFC Emerging Markets Bonds Electronic Database, 
IMF International Financial Statistics, Barnard and Thomsen (2002), and author’s calculation. 
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Figure 2.   Structure of Personal Ruble Deposits in Credit Institutions Classified by Maturity,  
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Figure  4   Structure of Aggregate Assets of Credit Institutions, Feb. 28, 2003 
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Figure 5   Structure of Aggregate Liabilities of Credit Institutions, Feb. 28, 2003 
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Figure 6   Deposit Money Banks' Foreign Assets and Liabilities 
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Figure 7   Deposits in Russian Banks and Cash Roubles in Circulation, % of GDP 
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Figure 8   Deposits in Russian Banks, % of GDP 
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              FOOTNOTES 
 
                                                 
* I would like to thank, without implicating, Tuomas Komulainen, Iikka Korhonen, Vesa 
Korhonen, Jouko Rautava, Pekka Sutela and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I 
owe a great debt to Inna Verbina whose ideas and encouragement got me launched on the 
study of the Russian banking structure. The paper was written during my visit to the 
Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) at the Bank of Finland. The hospitality and 
financial support from BOFIT is gratefully acknowledged.  
1 Banks can reduce the transaction costs of both the borrowers and lenders by lowering the 
search and risk assessment cost and the cost of monitoring and enforcing any contracts 
between the two parties [Sutela (1998), Tompson (2000)]. This also allows banks to 
overcome mismatches between them. It is particularly relevant for Russia where high-
return investment projects may require the commitment for long periods; however, given 
the presence of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and the high 
degree of political and economic uncertainty, savers may not be willing to give up control 
of their wealth for a long period of time. 
 
2 The dominant strength of the Russian oil, gas and metal industry has helped to keep this 
model intact even to this day. These industries generate all-important foreign currency 
revenues, and have an interest in controlling banks to optimize cash flows and reap 
maximum financial and political advantage from them. A number of FIGs have also used 
banks for maximizing offshore cash flows in their elaborate tax avoidance schemes. 
3 For a critical review of the banking sector in the early years of transition see, among 
others, Tompson (2002). 41 
                                                                                                                                                    
4 Setting aside off-balance sheet items, the open foreign currency position of the 
commercial banks just prior to the crisis amounted to about 18 percent of the balance sheet 
total (Thiessen, 2000, Table 1). 
5 The bridge banks took over the assets but not the liabilities. This was possible due to the 
weak enforcement of property rights. 
6 See, for instance, RECEP (1999). 
7 Until May 1999 about 60 to 70 percent of ruble deposits at commercial banks were 
transferred to Sberbank. The Sberbank’s share in total ruble denominated deposits 
increased from about 80 percent before the crisis to nearly 90 percent in summer of 1999 
(Thiessen, 2000). 
8 Sberbank was the only bank that enjoyed consumer confidence. This, in turn, created 
incentives for future moral hazard. 
9 In addition to the text, the Tables and Charts also show the current status of the banking 
sector. They are self-explanatory and, to conserve space, are not described in detail. 
10 Similar increase has been recored in foreign currency deposits (CBR: Bulletin of 
Banking Statistics, various issues). 
11 Veksels are short-term interenterprise debt obligations. The veksel market initially 
developed in mid-1990s, dried up after the 1998 crisis, but started to recover soon 
thereafter. It has now grown into a market for fixed-income financial instruments which 
are issued for raising short-term cash (one week to one year) for financing current 
operations of enterprises and banks. Liquid veksels now amount to about US $4.7 billion, 
twice the amount of corporate bonds (Euromoney, 2003b). 42 
                                                                                                                                                    
12 Banks typically lend for periods of 3 to 6 months, with credits extended for more than a 
year generally account for less than 10 percent of total lending (Tompson, 2000). 
13 Tompson (2000) argues that the state’s reliance on the banking system as an instrument 
for monitoring enterprise finances and collecting taxes constitutes the single greatest 
incentive to disintermediation. 
14 The Moscow Times, February 4, 2003, page 7. 
15 The case of Inkombank in 1998, its’ last year of operation, exemplifies the problem: the 
bank’s RAS results showed a profit of $422 million (despite losses of $700 million on their 
loan portfolio), while its IAS results showed a loss of $355 million (Tompson, 2000). 
16 Of the largest thirty Russian banks, only six are foreign-owned, and the share of the 
foreign banks amounts to no more than 7 percent of the banking sector’s total assets (see 
Table VIII). 
17 As of the end of December 2002, 27 fully foreign-owned bank subsidiaries and another 
10 banks with foreign majority ownership are operating in Russia (Table II). 
18 One factor inhibiting foreign investment is the risk associated with providing credits in 
an environment characterized with weak legal enforcement. Existing foreign banks had to 
invest considerable resources for managing their credit risks (World Bank, 2002a). Like 
their domestic counterparts, this has led them to encourage lending to large corporations. 
Their corporate and interbank loans contain very limited exposure to Russian risk.  
19 The move to IAS was initially expected to take effect in 2004. 
20 The scheme involves the creation of an insurance fund, managed by ARCO, and made 
up of contributions from all the involved banks. The government will contribute the first 
$100 million and will cover any unexpected deficit. Sberbank will also join the system but 43 
                                                                                                                                                    
will retain its state deposit guarantee until early 2007 (see Fantini, 2003 for a further 
discussion on deposit insurance]. 
21 Critics have suggested that Sberbank is blocking the passage of the deposit insurance 
bill, fearing – since it holds most deposits – that its contributions to the fund would pay for 
the mistakes of more reckless private banks (Economist, February 8, 2003, pp. 30-31). 
22 Joint Government/CBR Strategy for the Development of the Banking Sector of the 
Russian Federation (finalized in December 2001). 
23 Goskomstat data suggest that the share may be as low as 10-15 percent of GDP 
compared to about 50 percent in advanced transition economies. According to World Bank 
(2002b) estimate, SMEs must reach a threshold of 40 percent of total employment to 
become the engine of economic growth. This share is around 20 percent in Russia 
(Komulainen et al, 2003).  The modest share of SMEs can be attributed to the heavy 
dependence on the oil and energy sectors. Barnard and Thomsen (2002) attributes the 
dominance of conglomerates based in the natural resource sector partly to the ’Dutch 
disease’ effect of high oil price in the international market and the real appreciation of 
ruble. Poor investment climate outside the primary commodities sector as well as 
administrative barriers imposed at different levels of government also explain the lack of a 
dynamic SME sector. 
24 A new World Bank survey shows that recent deregulation has improved things for the 
SMEs: for the first time, Russian small businesses report that their biggest challenge is 
competition from each other rather than the heavy hand of government (Economist, 
February 8, 2003, pp. 30-31). But bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of bank loans are still 
their major problems.  
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